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FEDERAL VENUE REQUIREMENTS AND PROSECUTIONS
FOR FALSE FILING*
DEFENDANTS in all federal prosecutions 'have the constitutional right to be
tried in the judicial district where the alleged crime was committed., When
the Government prosecutes in an improper venue, the court upon timely ob-
jection must dismiss the indictment.2 If the statute of limitations has run, the
error will prevent further proceedings.3
Prosecutions involving the transmission of false statements to Governmental
agencies have posed recurrent venue problems.4 It is now clear that trial
may be held where the false information was received., And the defendant
cannot be tried in the place where he did no more than prepare the document,"
or where he omitted 'to prepare a return required by law.7 But it
is unsettled whether prosecution is proper in the district from which
*United States v. Valenti, 207 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Lepkoff, 113
F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Tenn. 1953).
1. U.S. CoNsT. AMmD. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law. . . ." (emphasis added). Similar language is contained in Art. III,
§ 2 of the Constitution.
2. United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273 (1944); United States v. Liss, 137 F.2d
995 (2d -Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 773 (1943); United States v. Moody, 102 F. Supp.
315 (W.D. Mo.), appeal dimnissed, 195 F2d 736 (8th Cir. 1952).
On the question of what constitutes timely objection, see, e.g., United States v. Zeull,
137 F.2d 845, 847 (2d Cir. 1943) ; Mahaffey v. Hudspeth, 12 F.2d 940, 942 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 666 (1942).
3. United States v. Borow, 101 F. Supp. 211, 215 (D.N.J. 1951), See also United
States v. Valenti, 207 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1953) (3-year statute bars prosecution since
affidavit filed in 1949).
4. For a general discussion of venue, see DoBmF, HANDBOOK OF Fmn&.AL Jumisicuiox
AND PROcEDURE 510-13 (1928).
5. Shurin v. United States, 164 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S.
837 (1948) (false selective service information); Bowles v. United States, 73 F.2d 772
(4th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 710 (1935) (fraudulent income tax return); United
States v. Eisler, 75 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1947), aff'd, 176 F2d 21 (D.C. Cir.), cert,
denied, 337 U.S. 958 (1949) (fraudulent passport application).
6. Reass v. United States, 99 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1938) (false statement to Federal
Home Loan Bank); Wampler v. Snyder, 66 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1933) (fraudulent
income tax return); United States v. Borow, 101 F. Supp. 211 (D.N.J. 1951) (false
representations to War Assets Administration).
7. Rumely v. McCarthy, 250 U.S. 283 (1919) (omission to file alien property
report); United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73 (1916) (omission to file Mann
Act report); United States v. Commerford, 64 F.2d 28 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
289 U.S. 759 (1933) (omission to file income tax return).
NOTES
the accused mailed the untrue data.8 The Ninth Circuit has held the district
of mailing proper venue,9 but there is Supreme Court dicta to the contrary.10
In the recent cases of United States v. Valknti 1 and United States v.
Lepkoff,12 the Third Circuit and a federal district court in Tennessee each held
that the district of mailing was improper venue. In the Valenti case the Gov-
ernment prosecuted a union leader for filing a false non-Communist affidavit
with the NLRB.' 3 The evidence indicated that Valenti signed and swore
to the affidavit in Camden, New Jersey, where he was tried and convicted.' 4
It was unclear how the affidavit reached the NLRB's main office in Wash-
ington, D.C.'r One judge in Valenti considered proper a prosecution in the
district of mailing.16 But he, on the ground that the Government failed to
prove the fact of mailing,17 concurred with the majority's reversal of the con-
viction. The two-judge majority held that venue was improper even if the
mailing was presumed.' 8 Lepkoff involved fraudulent evasion of income ta.es.'
Defendant mailed his returns in one judicial district of Tennessee to the tax
director in another district of the same state.20 After indictment in the district
S. Several courts specifically view this as an open question. Shurin v. United
States, 164 F.2d 566, 569-70 (4th Cir. 1947), ccrt. denied, 333 U.S. 837 (194IS);
Reass v. United States, 99 F.2d 752, 755 (4th Cir. 1938); United States v. Borow,
101 F. Supp. 211, 215 (D.NJ. 1951).
9. Bridgeman v. United States, 140 Fed. 577 (9th Cr. 1905) (false claim to
Commissioner of Indian Affairs).
10. "[O]ur attention has not been called to any case which decides that the
requirement of a statute... that a paper be filed with a particular officer, is satisfied
by a deposit in the post office at some distant place." United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S.
73, 78 (1916).
11. 207 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1953).
12. 113 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Tenn. 1953).
13. The defendant filed his affidavit in accordance with the Labor Management
Relations Act, 61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (Supp. 1952). The Gov-
ermnent prosecuted under the statute which forbids the making of false statements
"in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States." 62 STAT. 749 (1948), IS U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. 1952).
14. 207 F.2d 242, 243-4 (3d Cir. 1953).
15. Since there was no regional office of the NLRB in Camden, the affidavit
should have been sent to the Board's Philadelphia office. 29 Cor' FED. RnA-s. § 101.3-
(b) (1949); United States v. Valenti, 207 F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1953). The
Board's affidavit officer testified that the affidavit had been mailed to Washington,
but he did not know whether it had been mailed from Philadelphia or Camden.
The union's secretary testified she did not remember what happened to the affidavit
after it has been signed and sworn. Id. at 244-5.
16. Id. at 246.
17. Id. at 246-7.
18. Id. at 245. The Government had argued that the jury could infer from
the evidence that the affidavit vas mailed in Camden. Ibid.
19. The crime alleged was wilfully evading income tax payment by filing a
false return. IxT. Rav. CoDE § 145(b). For a discussion of the venue problem
in income tax cases, see XVampler v. Snyder, (6 F2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1933).
20. 113 F. Supp. 551, 554 (E.D. Tenn. 1953). Although the defendant delivered
some of his returns to the deputy tax director in his own judicial district, the court
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of receipt, he secured transfer of the case to the district of mailing where both
his and many of the Government's witnesses resided. 21 In Lcpkoff the court
retransferred the case to the district of receipt, which it held to be the only
proper venue.
22
Judges reach conflicting results in the "mailing" cases because they start
their analyses at different points. Thus, the majority in Valenti reasoned
that no crime was committed until the document reached the NLRB. 23 View-
ing the single element of receipt as essential to the crime of filing false in-
formation, they held that venue was proper only where the Government re-
ceived the affidavit.24 Everything prior to receipt, including mailing, was
irrelevant for venue purposes. 25 But the concurring judge in Valenti first
posited that the crime of filing, like other offenses, may have a "beginning."2 "
He argued that the defendant by mailing the affidavit committed a sufficiently
decisive act to constitute a "beginning. ' 27 When the Government received the
document, the crime would be complete. He would, therefore, apply the
"continuing offense" statute, which provides that crimes begun in one district
and completed in another may be prosecuted in either district.28
Both approaches find support in the leading venue cases,20 and sometimes
in the language of the same opinion.30 This anomaly arises because either
treated these returns as if they had been mailed to the tax director in the other
judicial district. Id. at 554, 555-6.
21. The transfer was made "in the interest of justice" on the authority of FEI). R.
CRim. P. 21 (b). See note 39 infra.
22. 113 F. Supp. 551, 556 (E.D. Tenn. 1953).
23. "While the matter may constitute the crime of perjury under state law, a false
statement has not been made in a matter within the jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board, within the meaning of section 1001, until the affidavit through its filing
has become the basis for action by the Board." United States v. Valenti, 207 F.2d 242, 244
(3d Cir. 1953).
24. Id. at 244-5.
25. Id. at 245.
26. Id. at 246.
27. Ibid.
28. 62 STAT. 826 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 3237 (Supp. 1952). The "continuing offense"
statute also applies to offenses "committed in more than one district." Had Congress in-
tended that only those offenses which were committed in two districts, i.e., were crimes
in both, were to be covered by § 3237, it would not have been necessary to include specific-
ally the phrase "begun in one district and completed in another." See H.R. RmI. No. 304,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. A161 (1947). This phrase would appear to be meaningless unless
interpreted to cover those situations like Valenti or Lepkoff where the defendant has
decisively committed himself in one district although the major element of the offense occurs
in another. The Ninth Circuit apparently takes this view. Bridgeman v. United States,
140 Fed. 577 (9th Cir. 1905).
29. Compare Bridgeman v. United States, 140 Fed. 577 (9th Cir. 1905) (district
of mailing false claim held proper venue), with Wampler v. Snyder, 66 F.2d 195, 196
(D.C. Cir. 1933) (dicta that district of mailing fraudulent income tax return improper).
30. Compare United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 77 (1916) (district of mailing
proper venue within meaning of "continuing offense" statute), with id. at 78 (suggesting




method of analysis will lead to the same result when the defendant personally
delivers the false data or omits to file a required return. In these cases courts
have argued that no crime is committed until receipt.31 Moreover, in these
cases, there is no decisive act prior to receipt, upon which to peg venue.3-
However, when the data is mailed, there is clearly a decisive act prior to
receipt.33 Therefore only in the "mailing" cases do the two rationales give
conflicting results.
Forbidding prosecution in the district of mailing imposes an unnecessary
burden on both the Government and defendant. People often file papers in
distant Governmental offices. Thus, in the twenty states that have fewer tax
districts than judicial districts,34 individuals in one judicial district may
have to send their returns to another.35 Trials in the district of receipt may
well entail the inconvenience and expense of transporting witnesses, lawvers,
and records considerable distances.36 Such consequences conflict with the pur-
pose of the constitutional provisions on venue.3 7 The drafters of the Constitu-
tion aimed at preventing trials far away from a defendant's evidence and
friends. 38
Even if both parties were willing to litigate in the district of mailing, the
Valenti-Lepkoff rule would apparently deny them their choice. While Rule
21(b) 39 allows transfer of criminal cases for the convenience of the defend-
31. See, e.g., Rumely v. McCarthy, 250 U.S. 283 (1919) (omission) ; Reass v. United
States, 99 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1938) (personal delivery) ; United States v. Commerford,
64 F.2d 28 (2d Cir.), cert. dcnied, 2S9 U.S. 759 (1933) (omission); United States v.
Borow, 101 F. Supp. 211 (D.N.J. 1951) (personal delivery).
32. United States v. Valenti, 207 F.2d 242, 246 n.1 (3d Cir. 1953).
33. See, e.g., Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 430-1 (1932); Salinger v.
Loisel, 265 U.S. 224,233-5 (1924) ; Reass v. United States, 99 F.2d 752, 755 (4th Cir. 1938).
34. These twenty states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Also,
residents in the District of Columbia and Alaska have to file in Maryland and Washington,
respectively. Data compiled from 3 P-H FED. TAx SEav. ' 'I 21,340-56 (1953) and 112
F. Supp. vii-xv (1953).
35. Taoxpayers must send their returns to the office in the tax district %,here they
reside or where they have their principal place of business. IXT. R-v. CoDr, § 53(b) (1).
36. For a discussion of these considerations, see United States v. White, 95 F. Supp.
544 (D. Neb. 1951) ; United States v. National City Lines, 7 F.R.D. 393, 393 (S.D. Cal.
1947).
37. For an excellent historical analysis, see United States v. Parker, 19 F. Supp. 450
(D.N.J. 1937), aff'd, 103 F.2d 857 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 642 (1939). See also
Hyde v. Shine, 199 U.S. 62, 78 (1905).
38. Ibid.
39. "The court upon motion of the defendant shall transfer the proceeding as to him
to another district or division, if it appears from the indictment or information or from
a bill of particulars that the offense was committed in more than one district or division
and if the court is satisfied that in the interest of justice the proceeding should be trans-
ferred to another district or division in which the commission of the offense is charged."
Fa. R. C~an. P. 21 (b).
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ant, the case may only be transferred to another district which 'has proper
venue.4 0 Moreover, although Rule 20 allows a defendant to plead guilty in a
district that would not otherwise be proper venue,41 no rule allows trial in
such a district.4 2 And there is some doubt that such a rule would be constitu-
tional.
4 3
To avoid the burdens of the Valenti and Lepkoff holdings, other courts should
permit prosecutions in the district of mailing. The "continuing offense"
statute is the obvious doctrinal tool for achieving this result. If Valenti and
Lepkoff are widely accepted, Congress can easily reverse the trend by appro-
priate legislation. Such legislation should specifically define the particular
crime of filing false data to include mailing the false information. 44 Congress
has acted in other instances when courts adopted a restrictive rule on venue.40
40. United States v. Erie Basin Metal Products Co., 79 F. Supp. 880 (D. Md. 1948);
United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 78 F. Supp. 409 (D. Hawaii 1948); Holdsworth v.
United States, 9 F.R.D. 198 (D. Me. 1949), appeal dimnissed, 179 F.2d 933 (1st Cir. 1950).
41. "A defendant arrested in a district other than that in which the indictment or
information is pending against him may state in writing, after receiving a copy of the
indictment or information, that he wishes to plead guilty or nolo contendere, to waive
trial in the district in which the indictment or information is pending and to consent to
disposition of the case in the district in which he was arrested, subject to the approval
of the United States attorney for each district." FED. R. Caum. P. 20.
42. See United States v. Lepkoff, 113 F. Supp. 551, 556 (E.D. Tenn. 1953).
43. For the view that venue may be jurisdictional in certain cases and, therefore,
cannot be waived, see United States v. Bink, 74 F. Supp. 603 (D. Ore. 1947). Other courts
have treated venue as a personal privilege which defendants can waive. United States v.
Gallagher, 183 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 913 (1951); Levine v.
United States, 182 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 921 (1951).
44. The applicable statute could be redrafted as follows: "Whoever, in any matter
within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and
wilfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact,
or makes, or deposits or causes to be deposited in the mail provided the satements or
representations are received by the department or agency, any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing
the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." (additions to
present statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. 1952), are italicized).
This statutory revision would probably allow income tax prosecutions in the district
of mailing. The change would undercut the authorities upon which the Lepkoff holding
is based.
45. See, e.g., Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 233-5 (1924); H. R. REP. No. 304,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. A161 (1947) (discussing congressional reversal of United States v.
Johnson, 323 U.S. 273 (1944).
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